[vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text]The unfortunate harsh reality, which has been widely reported in the press, is that lifeboat systems fatally injure more people than they
save. This can be attributed to a number of factors including poor or inadequate maintenance, lack of crew training, lack of familiarisation
in handling lifeboat equipment, ineffective (or the avoidance of) drills 
and safety devices being overridden as shortcuts to name a few. Indeed unfortunately, incidents occurring during routine planned drills are
particularly common. For example, in April of 2016 a fatal accident occurred onboard the MV Amazon at Constanta. The Bosun suffered a fatal
injury when he was struck on the base of the skull by the manual crank handle of the lifeboat winch after power was restored to the mechanism,
following several safety device overrides that had been made due to malfunctioning limit switches.
The good news is that these accidents and incidents are avoidable with adequate thorough maintenance, increased crew familiarity, routine
training on lifeboat handling and correct and effective drills. The key is to avoid complacency, assume items are in good order or that items can be overlooked this time as they were checked at the last interval,
because that is when people get hurt. Lifeboats are safety equipment and should not strike fear into the seafarer; they should be looked upon as
a vital safety net.
Some Key Areas of Concern/Focus
LRRS (Lifeboat Release and Retrieval System) failure – As a key contributor to lifeboat incidents, LRRS and most notably on-load release
hooks have always been a contentious subject. Since on-load hooks became a mandatory requirement from 1986 there have been numerous industry
studies that have exposed the vulnerabilities that these important sophisticated systems possess.
The studies have identified that the systems can become extremely unstable due to minor wear tolerances or poor adjustment of release
cables which could trigger unexpected releases, many times with fatal consequences. This coupled with designs that restrict proper maintenance and verification as well as complex operating and resetting requiring
high level of crew understanding.
Finally, after years of incidents, this prompted the IMO to act. Amendments to the LSA code under IMO Resolution MSC.320 (89) entered
into force on 1st July 2012 and this gave clear and stricter design and testing requirements that lifeboat release systems had to adhere to.
This was a retrospective requirement and it was to become applicable to all totally enclosed lifeboats that were fitted with on-load release hooks. From the first scheduled dry-docking after 1st July 2014, all
vessels with these lifeboat systems needed to be evaluated as to whether their existing on-load release hooks complied with the first three
applicable sections of the revised LSA Code. In conjunction with the equipment makers, hook systems needed to be certified compliant or modified to comply. In many instances, it would even be necessary to
completely change out the hook system to a brand new compliant system as modifications weren’t available or hook makers had ceased trading.
But, was this IMO ruling sufficient? Many think that although it was a great safety improvement the IMO missed a perfect opportunity to improve
on this a lot further.
Rather that banning non-compliant unstable hook systems, the IMO has given equipment makers the option to design modifications of which some
are as simple as just fitting a spring on a locking cam or fitting a counterweight locking lever. So, hooks that have been in use for over 20
years with varying degrees of wear are now able to be rendered completely stable and fail safe by the addition of a small spring. Time will tell if this approach is adequate but the harsh reality is that it
may cost a life to prove if it is not.
Another issue is the time given by the IMO for owners to ensure they have compliant LRRS fitted, which is 5 years. In some cases vessels
could be trading up to 2019 with hook systems that have been documented and identified as unstable and not compliant with the LSA code. All this
while still performing routine drills and relying on Fall Preventer Devises (FPD’s) to arrest any fall due to an unexpected hook release.[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row]
